Endnotes


Vol. 9 No. 3
December 2006/
January 2007

Return to Contents


Going Global
How in the world is Emory?

Global Scholarship for Informed Action

Around Campus, Around the World

"I think we want Emory people working in global health to have a kind of distinctive, humble, non-arrogant, cooperative ethos."

"Is this an imperialist culture, in which we are getting the Emory name brand out, or is it a genuinely inclusive, reciprocal partnership?"


Swimming with the Turbot
Scholarship for a Global Public

We May Be Using English, But That Doesn’t Mean We’re Speaking the Same Language
Universalizing global knowledge


Endnotes

Evaluating the European Union
I think the [European Union’s] availability as a union that guarantees democracy is one of the reasons why former communist countries, many of whom have very limited experiences of democracy in their history, are very interested in being in the E.U., so as to deepen the roots of democracy in their own cultures. In the area of commerce, we make our decisions by majority rule—or sort-of majority rule, really by a 70 percent majority. In the area of foreign policy, we make our decisions by unanimity. So not surprisingly, we don’t make that many decisions. . . . The E.U. does not raise taxes; the [United States] federal government does. The E.U. may not borrow—not a cent; the U.S. administration has been known to borrow occasionally. States may not withdraw from the United States of America. . . . In the E.U., any country may withdraw. No one’s actually contemplating withdrawing from the E.U. In fact, there’s a line of countries wanting to join. So we’re obviously doing something right.
— John Bruton, European Union Ambassador to the United States, former Prime Minister of Ireland, from “Building Peace and Prosperity: How the E.U.-U.S. Partnership Creates Jobs, Trade, and Security for Europeans and Americans,” September 14, 2006, sponsored by the Halle Institute

Carter in North Korea
In 1994, it was widely reported that the North Korean nuclear weapons program represented a great danger—a threat to regional and international security and a threat that could lead to war. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter intervened in this crisis despite the serious reservations of the U.S. and South Korean governments. . . . As the political stalemate became more and more tense, Carter came to the conclusion that someone had to go to North Korea and talk to Kim Il Sung, the one man who could decide whether there would be war or peace, and no one in the U.S. government was willing to talk to North Korea at the time—not the secretary of state, not an undersecretary of state. . . . The U.S. negotiation strategy at the time—and this won’t surprise you given what’s going on today—is that we have these sets of preconditions, and if you meet these preconditions then we’ll sit down and talk to you, and not until then. . . . The North Korean foreign minister stated very clearly that they did not fear sanctions. After all, the country had lived under economic sanctions for most of its existence. . . . The foreign minister also said, “make no mistake, we will treat sanctions as an act of war, and we will react accordingly.”
—Marion Creekmore, Distinguished Visiting Professor of History and Political Science, from “Citizen Jimmy Carter’s Intervention in the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” September 26, 2006, sponsored by the Halle Institute